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S/25945
14 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewi... a letter dated 10 June 1993 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, relating to the letter dated 28 May 1993 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the United Nations Programme and the security situation in northern Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 10 June 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 28 May 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the United Nations Programme and the security situation in northern Iraq. I should like to make certain facts clear to you and to the members of the Security Council and to set forth my Government's position on some of the points raised in that letter.

1. Iraq has stated on several occasions that since the autumn of 1991 the governorates of Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah have not been under the control of government authorities. The anomalous situation obtaining in these three governorates is the result of the direct military intervention of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France, which are preventing the Iraqi authorities from exercising their functions in these parts of Iraq and threatening to resort to force if the Iraqi authorities should assume their normal responsibilities there. As a result of this open interference in Iraq's internal affairs, the region has come under the control of armed bands and a state of virtual secession has been imposed. The area is wide open to the interference of the Iranian regime and of other States, to a repetition of the Iranian acts of aggression against its inhabitants and to widespread anarchy, instability and insecurity. The Iraqi authorities cannot, of course, accept any responsibility for what happens there, and this includes the threats made to United Nations personnel. Given the situation imposed on the Government of Iraq, it is surprising that the United Nations should ask it to take what it calls the "necessary measures" to improve the humanitarian situation in the northern governorates and to ensure the security of their inhabitants.

The Iraqi authorities are prepared to assume all of their normal responsibilities in the area if States members of the Security Council do not prevent them from so doing. Despite the anomalous situation, the Government has provided facilities to relief convoys proceeding to the northern governorates and to United Nations personnel in all the areas under its control in order to ensure the implementation of programmes approved under the Plan of Action covering these governorates and various other sectors.

2. Iraq has cooperated with the Humanitarian Programme since the signing of the first Memorandum of Understanding, in the anticipation that the Programme would provide essential assistance to adversely affected population groups. Events have, however, demonstrated that the Programme has been used for political purposes by certain foreign countries. Owing to pressures brought to bear by these States, the Programme has not attracted the funding necessary to meet its costs, which was the basic concern of the members of the Council as reflected in the letter. Consequently, Iraq is in no way responsible for the difficulties that have beset the Humanitarian Programme.

3. All unbiased observers know that the real way to alleviate the sufferings of the Iraqi population caused by shortages of food, medicines and other basic humanitarian needs is to lift the iniquitous embargo that has been maintained against Iraq for three years. The Security Council is therefore invited to fulfil its obligations towards Iraq and its people by lifting the embargo imposed on the Iraqi people rather than imputing unjust blame to the Iraqi authorities.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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S/25946
15 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of fresh violations by the Iranian side of the cease-fire provisions and the terms governing the area of separation between the two sides during the period from 1 May to 1 June 1993. Below is the situation with regard to the fresh violations.

1. At 1830 hours on 1 May 1993, a radio set was seen at the Iranian post in front of the Saddam guard post at geographical coordinates 430560, 100 metres from the international frontier.

2. At 1940 hours on 1 May 1993, a Santana vehicle carrying a 106-millimetre gun was seen coming from the Iranian rear and stopping in the Iranian zone in front of the Saddam guard post at geographical coordinates 430560.

3. At 1750 hours on 3 May 1993, barbed wire was seen to have been set up around the Iranian location in front of the Fakkah guard post at geographical coordinates 512502, 700 metres from the international frontier.

4. At 0845 hours on 4 May 1993, six Iranian soldiers were seen erecting barbed wire at their location in front of the Fakkah guard post at geographical coordinates 512501.

5. At 1300 hours on 9 May 1993, the Iranian side constructed a new post opposite the Shihabi border post at geographical coordinates 360446, 700 metres from the international frontier.

6. At 1700 hours on 9 May 1993, an Iranian helicopter was seen at geographical coordinates 8437 (Al-Asyud) coming from the Iranian rear. It continued flying for 15 minutes at low altitude along the line of the embankment and then returned to the Iranian rear.

7. At 2225 hours on 13 May 1993, the Iranian side opened fire with rifles from the Iranian post at geographical coordinates 019944 to the left of the Tib guard post, strafing the area facing the above-mentioned post, which is located 600 metres from the international frontier inside the area of separation.

8. At 2415 hours on 15 May 1993, the Iranian side reinforced its presence at geographical coordinates 908781 (Shalamcheh) with 10 to 15 persons wearing

military uniform and carrying arms (a mortar, a launcher and rifles). They dispersed onto the embankment facing the above-mentioned post inside the area of separation. At 1110 hours on 16 May 1993, they returned to the Iranian rear.

9. At 1550 hours on 17 May 1993, an 81-millimetre shell was seen to explode at geographical coordinates 957735 inside the area of separation. At 1710 hours on 17 May 1993, two khaki-coloured pick-ups were seen, each carrying five armed military men. They inspected the area where the shell exploded and then fired a number of intermittent shots in the direction of the Iraqi units. At 1200 hours on 18 May 1993, they returned to the Iranian rear.

10. At 1955 hours on 17 May, five Iranian soldiers were observed fortifying an abandoned position at geographical coordinates 517506 inside the area of separation.

11. At 1200 hours on 18 May 1993, five Iranian soldiers were seen fortifying a machine-gun position with corrugated iron sheeting in front of the Jalat guard post at geographical coordinates 850080 inside the area of separation.

12. At 1730 hours on 18 May 1993, 120-millimetre mortar shells were seen falling at the rate of one shell every two minutes at geographical coordinates 975733 across the Khayyen Canal, 100 metres inside Iranian territory. At 1700 hours, the Iranian shooting stopped.

13. At 1000 hours on 19 May 1993, a khaki-coloured helicopter was seen coming from the Iranian rear and landing at geographical coordinates 518529 in front of the Fakkah guard post in the Iranian location. After 15 minutes, it returned to the Iranian rear.

14. At 1015 hours on 19 May 1993, two Iranian soldiers were seen observing the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 299814 in front of the Sharhani guard post inside the area of separation.

15. At 1300 hours on 19 May 1993, an armed Iranian patrol seized an Iraqi fishing boat operating in Iraqi territorial waters in the area facing Abadan. On board the boat were:

(a) Jasim Ramadan;

(b) Nazim Jasim;

(c) Salim Jasim.

16. On 19 May 1993, the Iranian side discharged oil refinery waste-matter into the Shatt al-Arab, polluting its waters.

17. At 2240 hours on 19 May 1993, the sound was heard of metal pegs and barricades being implanted in front of the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 590385 inside the area of separation.

18. At 0815 hours on 20 May 1993, nine Iranian soldiers were seen strengthening a position in front of the Fakkah guard post at geographical coordinates 514501 inside the area of separation.

19. At 0815 hours on 20 May 1993, two excavators and a grader were seen opening up a road leading to the oil well in front of the Saddam guard post at geographical coordinates 4356 inside the area of separation.

20. At 0830 hours on 20 May 1993, six Land-Rover military pick-ups, each carrying four military men armed with launchers and light rifles and two of them with a single-phase machine-gun mounted on top, and a Vaz vehicle carrying military personnel were sighted. They halted at geographical coordinates 956723, when the men alighted and fired with the machine-guns, launchers and light rifles in the direction of the village of Al-Yawarin. At 0925 hours, five Land-Rover pick-ups and the Vaz vehicle withdrew, and one Land-Rover carrying a machine-gun remained. The withdrawal route was in the direction of the Iranian post at geographical coordinates 971732. Thirteen men alighted at the post, and the vehicles returned in the direction of the Iranian rear.

21. At 0930 hours on 20 May 1993, three Land-Rover pick-ups were seen, one carrying a mortar and the others carrying single-phase machine-guns. They halted at geographical coordinates 97742, and 25 military men alighted carrying launchers and rifles. They inspected the area and fired into the reeds on the bank of the Khayyen Canal, parallel to the front, and then set fire to the reeds.

22. At 1055 hours on 20 May 1993, six Iranian soldiers were seen constructing a reed hut in front of the Fakkah guard post at geographical coordinates 517506 inside the area of separation.

23. At 1530 hours on 20 May 1993, 15 Land-Rover pick-ups with a Poclain excavator approached. Fifty military personnel alighted at geographical coordinates 971731, where they demolished a portion of the bridge over the Khayyen Canal.

24. At 1700 hours on 20 May 1993, three vehicles with a Poclain excavator approached and demolished the bridge over the Khayyen Canal at geographical coordinates 944741.

25. At 0850 hours on 21 May 1993, an excavator was seen operating in front of the Saddam guard post at geographical coordinates 420560 inside the area of separation.

26. At 0900 hours on 21 May 1993, as the fishing boats were going out into the Shatt al-Arab, the Iranian side opened fire on the boats in the restricted area between Karun and Umm al-Rasas island at geographical coordinates 30705. As a result of the incident, two Iraqi fishing boats were hit.

27. At 1055 hours on 21 May 1993, six Iranians erected barbed wire around the Iranian post in front of the Fakkah guard post at geographical coordinates 503533 inside the area of separation.

28. At 1200 hours on 21 May 1993, the Iranian guard post in the Iranian Manyumi area fired in the direction of Iraqi fishermen who were engaging in their business in the area of the Shatt al-Arab off Faw district. Their names are:

(a) Muhammad Salim Hamid;

(b) Na'man Badran;

(c) Husayn Muhammad.

29. At 0600 hours on 22 May 1993, four Iranian military men armed with light weapons carried off a small military boat from the Iraqi bank of the Shatt al-Arab facing Basra port at geographical coordinates 470. They abducted two Iraqi fishermen, taking them to the Iranian bank, and informed the others that they would return the two fishermen after they had interrogated them.

30. At 0830 hours on 22 May 1993, 75 men from the Iranian side were seen constructing 2-metre-high observation posts of sandbags, 5 metres in front of the Iranian post at geographical coordinates 905241 inside the area of separation.

31. At 1500 hours on 22 May 1993, an Iranian excavator was seen in the vicinity of the Iranian control post at geographical coordinates 435042 opposite the Iraqi units digging and adjusting the earth. Near it were four civilians with 10 soldiers and a white-coloured pick-up. At 1515 hours, the vehicle departed with the civilians to the Iranian rear. At 1600 hours on the same day, the excavator halted operations, and Iranian soldiers erected an aerial on the Khosravi guard post at geographical coordinates 1435045 inside the area of separation.

32. On 22 May 1993, the Iranian patrols apprehended the two Iraqi fishermen:

(a) Sami Talib Jabr;

(b) Hadi Karim Khaz'al

and took them away to the Iranian side. They released the men some hours later.

33. At 1750 hours on 22 May 1993, eight Iranian boats were seen downstream protecting the two boats of the patrol opposite the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 6216.

34. From 2300 to 2330 hours on 22 May 1993, the Iranian side fired on Iraqi fishing boats in the area facing the Karun river.

35. At 0600 hours on 23 May 1993, the Iranian side fired a number of shots at the observation position of the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 6805.

36. At 1910 hours on 23 May 1993, about eight men from the Iranian side were seen strengthening the positions in front of the Fakkah guard post at geographical coordinates 517506, 1,000 metres from the international frontier.

37. At 0850 hours on 24 May 1993, two radio stations belonging to the Iranian side were seen at geographical coordinates 518529 in front of the Fakkah guard post, 1,200 metres from the international frontier.

38. At 0550 hours on 25 May 1993, two Iranian aircraft, an F-4 and an F-5, carried out a raid on the outskirts of the town of Khalis and dropped their payload on the civilian population. The raid set on fire and destroyed a water tanker and injured a farmer.

39. At 0610 hours on the same day, 25 May 1993, four Iranian F-4 warplanes carried out a raid on the Jalula' camp, causing various kinds of damage. The Iranian aircraft returned in the direction of the Iranian rear following the route Jalula' - Tabbah village - Hamrin lake - Iranian frontier.

40. At 1000 hours on 25 May 1993, the Iranian side fired GC rounds at the Iraqi tugboat Mithaq, which was proceeding from Faw to Ma'qil in the Shahiniyah area at geographical coordinates 665.

41. At 0920 hours on 27 May 1993, four Iranian soldiers were seen fortifying huts in front of the Jalat guard post at geographical coordinates 850800 inside the area of separation.

42. At 0100 hours on 28 May 1993, an Iranian helicopter was seen coming from the Iranian rear and then landing in the Naft-e Shah area at geographical coordinates 448608. At 1145 hours, it returned to the Iranian rear.

43. At 805 hours on 30 May 1993, about seven men from the Iranian side were seen strengthening the barbed wire in front of the Fakkah guard post at geographical coordinates 514501 inside the area of separation.

44. At 1815 hours on 30 May 1993, the Iranian side erected an 8- to 10-metre-high metal tower at geographical coordinates 9328, 2 kilometres distant from the Iraqi units.

45. At 1650 hours on 1 June 1993, about 12 men from the Iranian side, 8 of them in military uniform and 4 in mufti, were seen digging new positions in front of the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 420563 in front of the Saddam guard camp inside the area of separation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/25947
15 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continued their violations of Iraqi national airspace for purposes of reconnaissance and provocation, and in order to drop heat flares, during the period 5 to 10 June 1993.

5 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 33 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Sinjar and Tall Afar.

At 1155 and 1240 hours on 5 June 1993, a hostile F-16 aircraft dropped five heat flares in the Tall Kayf district.

At 1835 hours on 5 June 1993, two hostile aircraft dropped one heat flare in the Qarah Qush area.

(b) Southern region: 46 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Jalibah and Busayyah.

6 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 30 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, and Amadiyah.

At 1240 hours on 6 June 1993, an aggressor aircraft dropped five heat flares to the south of the lake formed by Saddam Dam in the Ninawa Governorate.

At 1245 hours on 6 June 1993, a hostile two-aircraft formation dropped five heat flares in the Mosul Dam area.

(b) Southern region: 41 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Sukkar, Jalibah, Amarah and Busayyah.

7 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 46 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Qal'at Salih, Samawah, Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Jalibah, Khidr, Artawi, Basra, Amarah and Salman.

8 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 14 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,500 to 9,500 metres, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Amadiyah and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 57 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Salman and Busayyah.

At 1010 hours on 8 June 1993, a hostile F-16 aircraft dropped three heat flares in the Salamiyah areas of the Ninawa Governorate.

At 2101 hours on 8 June 1993, a hostile aircraft dropped one heat flare over Hawr al-Rumayd in the Islah district.

9 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 18 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Sinjar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: No hostile air activity was reported in the southern region on this day.

10 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Ayn Zalah and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 44 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Khidr, Busayyah, Jalibah, Amarah and Qurnah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/25948
15 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of violations by the Kuwaiti side of the provisions of the cease-fire and of the instructions relating to the demilitarized zone.

1. At 1100 hours on 4 May 1993, a number of Kuwaiti fishing boats were seen fishing close to the Iraqi shore between buoy 23, at coordinates 1022, and buoy 27, at coordinates 9121. Some of the Kuwaiti boats fired in the direction of Coast Guard vessels carrying out their duties in Iraqi waters.

2. At 1100 hours on 5 May 1993, a number of Kuwaiti fishing boats were seen fishing close to the Iraqi shore between buoy 21, at coordinates 1317, and buoy 25, at coordinates 0425. Some of the Kuwaiti boats fired in the direction of Coast Guard vessels carrying out their duties in Iraqi waters.

3. At 2200 hours on 8 April 1993, the Kuwaiti side fired a number of automatic-rifle and pistol shots at coordinates 646292 in the direction of Iraqi territory.

4. At 1400 hours on 16 May 1993, personnel at the Kuwaiti Azamiyah post, at coordinates 717378, fired three separate bursts from a medium machine-gun in the direction of the Iraqi Abu Musa post.

5. At 1100 hours on 24 May 1993, the Kuwaiti side introduced a military recovery tank into the demilitarized zone at coordinates 620329.

6. At 2200 hours on 27 May 1993, a Kuwaiti patrol abducted the Iraqi farmers Adnan Jabbar Abd Allah, Basim Jabbar Abd Allah, Ibrahim Abd al-Muhsin Jabbar and Matar Musa Sharid while they were at their farm in the boundary zone.

7. At 0230 hours on 29 May 1993, the Kuwaiti side fired a number of automatic-rifle shots from the Abdali post, at coordinates 612320, in the direction of the Safwan post, at coordinates 604344.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/25949
15 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Government of the Republic of Croatia deeply deplores the tragic death of the valiant Spanish officer, Francisco Jesus Aguilar, who was killed in the line of duty on 11 June 1993 in the town of Mostar, on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is another unfortunate casualty that the United Nations Protection Force has suffered during its noble peace-keeping and humanitarian mission. Each one of these incidents must be carefully investigated, including the tragic loss of life of Lieutenant Aguilar, so that all the causative circumstances could be taken into account and those who are responsible for these crimes against humanity could be brought to justice.

The facts which have been established so far concerning Lieutenant Aguilar's death provide no clear evidence as to who attacked the vehicle in which the Spanish officer was killed. Therefore, it would be premature to draw any firm conclusions and put the blame on just one side. The sacrifice of Lieutenant Aguilar must not be in vain or misused for small political gains, but should serve as a turning-point in repulsing all kinds of militant extremism in the region.

The overall situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is worsening and calls for imminent action by the international community. In order to stop and reverse the disturbing violence and anarchy, which has increased since the United States and its allies announced in Washington the so-called Joint Action Program, it is necessary to start rapid implementation of the Vance-Owen plan and all the relevant Security Council resolutions. Until then it is of the utmost importance to establish an undisturbed flow of humanitarian help for the benefit of the endangered civilian victims of Serbian aggression. Any violent attempt to stop or slow down the distribution of humanitarian supplies must be considered as an intolerable act against basic norms of humanitarian law. In the light of this fact, the Croatian Government is calling upon all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina to enable free and unlimited delivery of humanitarian help, which must be equally distributed to all the victims of aggression, among whom there is a significant number of ethnic Croats.

Croatia has officially urged the Security Council to post its monitors along the entire international border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is the firm opinion of the Croatian Government that this measure would significantly contribute to easing the tensions in the region. At the same time, it would prove how unfounded are the allegations of the "interference" of the Croatian Government in the internal affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Republic of Croatia is ready to participate actively in the implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions, but it is the United Nations and the world community which should use determined action to promote peace and stability in the area. The Croatian Government repeats its calls for a Security Council emergency session to address the ongoing violence in central Bosnia (as I have stated in my letter, S/25920, dated 9 June 1993) and the vicious Serbian attacks on "safe areas" that demand sincere response by the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/25950
14 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 13 June 1993 addressed to you by Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 13 June 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

We should like to call the attention of the Security Council to an alarming statement made by Mordechai Gur, Israeli Deputy Minister of Defence, concerning Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. On 7 June 1993, Agence France-Presse transmitted the following news item:

> "The Israeli Deputy Minister of Defence, Mordechai Gur, said on Sunday, 6 June 1993, that Israel would respond to a nuclear strike from any Arab State a hundred times over.
>
> "Mordechai Gur, speaking at a meeting held at the Institute for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University on the twelfth anniversary of the Israeli attack on the Tammuz reactor in Iraq, said that Arab leaders must realize that a nuclear attack on Israel could not be to their advantage. He went on to say, 'We are capable of responding a hundredfold.'"

This official statement of the Deputy Minister of Defence is unequivocal and indubitable confirmation that Israel does have nuclear weapons and that it possesses a large stock of them; General Mordechai Gur speaks clearly and shamelessly of the hundreds of nuclear strikes that Israel can make against the Arab countries.

Iraq has warned on a previous occasion of the dangers inherent in the Security Council's negative attitude on this matter. In my letter of 28 October 1992 addressed to the President of the Council (S/24726), I stated as follows:

> "Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) stipulating, inter alia, that Iraq is to be deprived of certain types of weapons and imposing on it a strict prohibition with regard to their future production, the Security Council and other United Nations organs (the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) have been waging a ferocious and unparalleled campaign for implementation of this particular part of the resolution ...
>
> "...
>
> "The Security Council, which has waged such a ferocious campaign against Iraq for close to two years, has not, however, given any thought to devoting a single moment of its time to following up another essential part of resolution 687 (1991), namely that in which the Council:
>
> > 'Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons.'

This vital part of the resolution is of the Security Council's own making, but the Council has done nothing to follow it up at the very time the feverish pace of the arms race in the region is accelerating, including that for the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Disregard for this part of the resolution or failure to ensure its proper implementation would do serious damage not only to the concept of security and to the possibility of its establishment in the region but also to the security and sovereignty of other States in the region, among them Iraq."

As matters now stand, we and the international community are entitled to ask with regard to this explicit declaration of possession of nuclear weapons: What measures will the Security Council take under the terms of resolution 687 (1991), which the members of the Council constantly stress was adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter?

The continued silence of the Security Council on this grave matter and its failure to take the necessary measures to implement paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991) confirm the statements of all impartial observers in all parts of the world concerning the double standards that govern Security Council procedures as they relate to States.

The Security Council bears full responsibility for this grave situation.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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S/25951
15 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that the Rwandese Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front have just drawn up a joint request, the text of which is annexed hereto, concerning the stationing of a neutral international force in Rwanda.

In this connection, the two parties agreed during the current peace negotiations in Arusha that the implementation of the peace agreement in Rwanda requires the deployment of a neutral international force as soon as the peace agreement is signed.

To that end, the two negotiating parties and the Facilitator, in the person of His Excellency the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, requested the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations to hold consultations in order to determine the modalities for their collaboration in establishing the neutral international force.

At a plenary meeting held on 6 June 1993, the Facilitator informed the two parties that the OAU Secretary-General had notified him that at the consultations between OAU and the United Nations it was decided that the United Nations should assume responsibility for and command of the neutral international force.

The two parties welcome this decision and agree that the United Nations should assume responsibility for and command of the neutral international force and they assure it of their complete cooperation.

In view of the foregoing and in order to make it possible to deploy the neutral international force as soon as the peace agreement is signed, the two parties request the United Nations to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda as speedily as possible in order to assess all the needs of the international force.

The parties consider that the reconnaisance mission can also, within the framework of preparing the operations to disengage the two forces involved in the conflict and on the basis of criteria that are already agreed, demarcate

assembly areas, identify the sites to be used as assembly points and billeting stations and also establish the security parameters for the cities of Kigali and Byumba. This mission will also have the task of estimating the size of the neutral international force to be deployed in Rwanda.

In the request contained in the annex, you will find the missions which the two parties are proposing within the framework of defining the mandate to be given to the neutral international force.

The two parties hope that the neutral international force will be deployed as quickly as possible after the signing of the peace agreement in order to permit its speedy implementation and, in particular, the establishment of a broad-based transitional government, thereby avoiding excessively long intervals, which might be detrimental to the peace process.

To this end, I shall appreciate the measures that you will consider within the Security Council in order to give an urgent response to this request so that the desired reconnaissance mission will be sent to Rwanda as soon as possible.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as documents of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Damascène BIZIMANA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Rwanda to the United Nations

Annex

Joint request by the Rwandese Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the stationing of a neutral international force in Rwanda

The Government of the Rwandese Republic and the Rwandese Patriotic Front wish to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that they agreed, during the current peace negotiations in Arusha, that the implementation of the peace agreement in Rwanda requires the deployment of a neutral international force as soon as the peace agreement is signed.

To this end, the two negotiating parties and the Facilitator requested the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations to hold consultations in order to determine the modalities for their collaboration in establishing the neutral international force.

At a plenary meeting on 6 June 1993, the Facilitator informed the two parties that the OAU Secretary-General had notified him that at the consultations between OAU and the United Nations it was decided that the United Nations should assume responsibility for and command of the neutral international force.

The two parties welcome this decision and agree that the United Nations should assume responsibility for and command of the neutral international force and they assure it of their complete cooperation.

In view of the foregoing and in order to make it possible to deploy the neutral international force as soon as the peace agreement is signed, the two parties request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to send a reconnaissance mission to Rwanda as speedily as possible in order to assess all the needs of the neutral international force.

The reconnaissance mission can also, within the framework of preparing the operations to disengage the two forces involved in the conflict and on the basis of criteria agreed upon by the parties, demarcate the assembly areas, identify the sites to be used as assembly points and billeting stations and also establish the security parameters for the city of Kigali as part of its neutralization in order to protect the transitional institutions. This mission will also have the task of estimating the size of the neutral international force to be deployed in Rwanda.

The two parties would also like to suggest that the neutral international force should be deployed as speedily as possible after the signing of the peace agreement. It would be desirable to consider in the interim the composition and effective deployment of the force, secondment of personnel from the various peace-keeping forces deployed elsewhere in order to permit the speedy implementation of the peace agreement and, in particular, the establishment of a broad-based transitional government, thereby avoiding excessively long intervals, which might be detrimental to the peace process.

In order to help the Security Council to define the mandate of the neutral international force, the two parties propose that the following missions should be assigned to it:

A. General mission

The neutral international force shall assist in the implementation of the peace agreement, more specifically by supervising the implementation of the protocol on the National Army, the National Gendarmerie and the other security services and by providing all forms of assistance to the authorities and competent bodies.

To this end, it will carry out the following missions:

B. Security missions

1. Guarantee overall security in the country and monitor, in particular, the way in which the authorities and competent bodies maintain public order;

2. Maintain security during the distribution of humanitarian aid;

3. Help to ensure the safety of the civilian population;

4. Assist in the search for weapons caches and in the neutralization of armed bands throughout the country;

5. Carry out mine-clearing operations;

6. Participate in the recovery of all arms distributed to, or illegally acquired by, the civilian population;

7. Monitor the observance by the two parties of the arrangements for a definitive cessation of hostilities as contained in the peace agreement.

C. Missions to monitor the formation of the National Army

1. Demarcate assembly areas and establish sites to be used as assembly points and billeting stations;

2. The neutral international force shall be responsible for preparing the assembly points and billeting stations. It shall receive and administer all the material and financial means required to carry out this task. Military camps may serve as assembly points or billeting stations provided that the two parties are so informed. These camps shall be monitored by the neutral international force and shall conform to the conditions established for other assembly points and billeting stations;

3. Establish security parameters for Kigali in order to ensure its neutralization;

4. Monitor:

   - The disengagement of forces, in particular the movement of troops to assembly points and of military personnel returning heavy weapons to billeting stations;

   - The conversion of military camps into assembly points and billeting stations;

   - Verification activities subsequent to these operations;

5. Ensure that discipline is observed by military personnel both within and outside assembly points;

6. Monitor the inventories of arms and munitions of the two parties as well as the separation of heavy weapons from light weapons;

7. Guard billeting stations and help guard depots of light arms and their ammunition at assembly points;

8. Supervise the identification of military personnel; this operation will be carried out at the various troop-assembly points;

9. Supervise the provision of supplies to troops at assembly stations; supplies shall be limited to non-lethal items;

10. Take part in the training programme for members of the new armed forces and provide security at training centres;

11. Supervise the demobilization of military personnel and gendarmes not retained in the new armed forces;

12. Evaluate the implementation of the training process and make recommendations to the broad-based transitional government, the High Command Council of the National Army and the Command Council of the National Gendarmerie.

The two parties should like to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that they are sending a copy of this request to the Facilitator, His Excellency Ali Hassan Mwinyi, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, to the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, for their information.

The two parties take this opportunity to convey to the Secretary-General of the United Nations their great appreciation for the interest that he continues to show in the success of the peace process in Rwanda, and for his prompt attention to this request.

Done at Arusha, 11 June 1993.

For the Government of the Rwandese Republic:

(Signed) Boniface NGULINZIRA
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

For the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

(Signed) Pasteur BIZIMUNGU
Member of the Executive Committee and Commissioner for Information and Documentation

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25952
15 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan on the latest Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan, in the districts of Agdam and Agdjabedi, which began on 12 June 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic

At dawn on 12 June, after prolonged and intensive artillery preparation and massed air attacks with Mig-23 and Su-25 operational aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters, the Armenian army began an offensive in the direction of Agdam and Agjabedi districts of Azerbaijan. The offensive by the Armenian army made use of tanks, armoured vehicles, rocket and howitzer artillery and a large number of troops. The attack caused considerable destruction and claimed casualties among the civilian population, and a number of villages in Agdam and Agjabedi districts were captured.

On 14 June, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia began a large-scale offensive against the villages of Shelli, Marzili, Yusifchanly, Chinli, Eni Garalar, Alichanly and the town of Agdam. By 1200 hours local time on 14 June, there was fighting on the approaches to the villages of Alimadatli and Chinli of Agdam district.

On the same day, the Armenian armed forces undertook an offensive against the villages of Akop-Kamari and Magavuz of Agdere district of the Azerbaijani Republic. The district centre of Agdere is being subjected to systematic artillery shelling.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan notes that the latest offensive by the Armenian side is not accidental. It confirms at least two circumstances about which Azerbaijan in its appeals has long warned the international community, unfortunately without success. The first is Armenia's unwillingness and unreadiness to seek ways of reaching a peaceful settlement of the conflict and, as a consequence, its reliance on military might. Secondly, in view of the reaction of leading States and international public opinion, Armenia feels that it can act with impunity and, hence, it wishes to continue its policy of territorial expansion, which has become a State policy.

Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan draws attention to the fact that the latest offensive by the Armenian side is taking place at a time when an advance observer group from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is prepared to arrive in pursuance of Security Council resolution 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993. The offensive is taking place at a time when the United States of America, Russia and Turkey have twice come forward with peace initiatives, and the CSCE "nine-plus-one" group has proposed a "schedule of urgent measures", to which Azerbaijan has given an affirmative reply.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan considers that it is difficult to show one's cynical disregard for the international community's peace efforts more blatantly than Armenia is now doing.

Azerbaijan has long awaited effective measures on the part of prestigious international organizations to restrain the aggressor. General declarations and calls for an end to hostilities no longer do anyone any good. Such an attitude towards the aggressor and his victim gives us the impression that a policy of "double standards" is being employed in an effort to pacify the aggressor; this can undermine the peace process and have doleful consequences.

Azerbaijan once again appeals to the Security Council, CSCE and international public opinion to impose the relevant sanctions under the Charter of the United Nations against Armenia as the aggressor State, forcing it to end its persistent frustration of peace initiatives, and to create a real mechanism for implementing the decisions that have been taken.

Baku, 14 June 1993

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25953
15 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Once again the Serbian insurgents in the Republic of Croatia have stepped up their attacks on the civilian targets along the Croatian Adriatic coast. Yesterday, completely unprovoked, the Serbian gunners have attacked the coastal town of Biograd na Moru, a settlement of no military significance and without military installations. Yet again the insurgents have used the Multiple-Rocket-Launchers "Orkan" [four missiles with cluster-bombs warheads]. The attack started at 1532 hours with the missiles, followed by howitzers and mortars, and resulted in five deaths [including two children aged 11 and 12 - both killed while on the beach] and seven seriously injured people. Material damage to infrastructure and family homes is considerable.

At 1315 hours, the enemy launched an attack on the surroundings of the city of Sibenik, causing material damage. However, following the attack three children - while playing - found one of the unexploded minelets previously delivered by the cluster-bomb warhead of the "Orkan" missile, which resulted in the death of two and life-threatening injuries to the third boy [all aged 13 to 15].

In the view of my Government, this represents a planned action of the Serbian insurgents pursuing the renewal of the war on the territory of the Republic of Croatia - just prior to the so-called "referendum" of the local Serbs for unification with "other Serb countries", and the conclusion of the mandate of UNPROFOR on 30 June. Once again, I have to state that the Government of the Republic of Croatia will try not to be provoked to enter into an armed conflict against the self-proclaimed Serbian leaders who are using all means to retain their power in the occupied territories, and to make the referendum a "success" for them.

My Government welcomes the statement by the President of the Security Council made at its 3231st meeting (S/25879), and calls upon the international community to prevent the negative consequences which will follow the so-called "referendum" that is to take place 19 and 20 June 1993. The Council has on several occasions reiterated that the "UNPAs are integral parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia", and it is the firm belief of my Government that the forthcoming so-called "referendum" constitutes an "action inconsistent with this", and thus unacceptable to the Council.

In the view of the expiration of the present mandate of the peace-keeping force on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, one has to recognize that there are only two options open for the Government of the hosting country: to accept the continuation of the mandate, provided that it is extensively amended, incorporates a precise timetable of action, the means of implementation and that it includes specific enforcement powers for the UNPROFOR in the case of non-compliance by the Serbian militants; or to decline altogether the further good offices of the peace-keeping forces.

I would ask for your kind assistance to distribute this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25954
16 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to bring to your attention, and through you to the attention of the members of the Security Council, the attached letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Letter dated 11 June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the United States has decided to offer a reinforced company team of approximately 300 troops to operate with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) forces now stationed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The United States wishes to supply these troops to augment the UNPROFOR forces now in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We do not intend that United States troops should replace the current UNPROFOR units there.

The United States views this offer as further evidence of our commitment to support multilateral efforts to prevent spillover and contribute to stability in the Balkan region.

I would appreciate your conveying my Government's offer to the Security Council.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25954/Add.1
17 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Addendum

1. It is estimated that the cost associated with the deployment of 300 additional troops to reinforce the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will amount to some $10.5 million for an initial six-month period. It is further estimated that the monthly cost thereafter will be approximately $1.5 million. A breakdown of the estimated cost for the first six-month period, by main categories of expenditure, is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

2. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to approve the proposed course of action and enlarge the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR, that the additional cost relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the UNPROFOR special account.

Notes

1/ S/25954.

Annex

Cost estimate of the additional costs to the United Nations for the activities of UNPROFOR

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Objects of expenditure	Initial six months
1.	Military component	
	(a) Contingent personnel	2 833
	(b) Other costs pertaining to contingents	1 850
2.	Civilian staff costs	-
3.	Premises/accommodation	1 498
4.	Air operations	-
5.	Transport operations	1 771
6.	Communications	1 250
7.	Miscellaneous equipment	750
8.	Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	530
	Total	10 482

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25955
17 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) and all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),

Recalling in particular resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992 which authorized the UNPROFOR presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

Welcoming the important contribution of the existing UNPROFOR presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to stability in the region,

Seeking to support efforts for a peaceful resolution to the situation in the former Yugoslavia as it relates to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as provided for in the Secretary-General's report of 10 December 1992 (S/24923) and approved by resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992,

Noting with appreciation the offer made by a Member State (S/25954 and Add.1) to contribute additional personnel to the UNPROFOR presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the latter Government's favourable response thereto,

1. Welcomes the offer made by a Member State to contribute additional personnel to the UNPROFOR presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and decides to expand the size of UNPROFOR accordingly and to authorize the deployment of these additional personnel;

2. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25956
17 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council

Recalling its resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia and all other relevant resolutions,

Recalling also Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of requests for assistance have been received under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Noting that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991), at its 65th meeting, set up a working group to examine the above-mentioned requests,

1. Confirms that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) is entrusted with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations;

2. Welcomes the establishment by the Committee of its working group and invites the Committee, as it completes the examination of each request, to make recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25957
16 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

France, the United States of America and Venezuela:
draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having received a letter from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the President of the Council dated 7 June 1993 (S/25958) requesting that the Council make universal and mandatory the trade embargo on Haiti recommended by the Organization of American States,

Having also heard a report of the Secretary-General on 10 June 1993 regarding the crisis in Haiti,

Noting resolutions MRE/RES.1/91, MRE/RES.2/91, MRE/RES.3/92 and MRE/RES.4/92 adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, and resolution CP/RES.594 (923/92) and declarations CP/Dec.8 (927/93), CP/Dec.9 (931/93) and CP/Dec.10 (934/93) adopted by the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,

Noting in particular resolution MRE/RES.5/93 adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States in Managua, Nicaragua, on 6 June 1993,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 46/7 of 11 October 1991, 46/138 of 17 December 1991, 47/20 A of 24 November 1992, 47/143 of 18 December 1992 and 47/20 B of 23 April 1993,

Strongly supportive of the continuing leadership by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States and of the efforts of the international community to reach a political solution to the crisis in Haiti,

Commending the efforts undertaken by the Special Envoy for Haiti of the United Nations and Organization of American States Secretaries-General, Mr. Dante Caputo, to establish a political dialogue with the Haitian parties with a view to resolving the crisis in Haiti,

Recognizing the urgent need for an early, comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the crisis in Haiti in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and international law,

Also recalling the statement of 26 February 1993 (S/25344), in which the Council noted with concern the incidence of humanitarian crises, including mass displacements of population, becoming or aggravating threats to international peace and security,

Deploring the fact that, despite the efforts of the international community, the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide has not been reinstated,

Concerned that the persistence of this situation contributes to a climate of fear of persecution and economic dislocation which could increase the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighbouring Member States and convinced that a reversal of this situation is needed to prevent its negative repercussions on the region,

Recalling, in this respect, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, and stressing the need for effective cooperation between regional organizations and the United Nations,

Considering that the above-mentioned request of the Permanent Representative of Haiti, made within the context of the related actions previously taken by the Organization of American States and by the General Assembly of the United Nations, defines a unique and exceptional situation warranting extraordinary measures by the Security Council in support of the efforts undertaken within the framework of the Organization of American States, and,

Determining that, in these unique and exceptional circumstances, the continuation of this situation threatens international peace and security in the region,

Acting, therefore, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Affirms that the solution of the crisis in Haiti should take into account the above-mentioned resolutions of the Organization of American States and of the General Assembly of the United Nations;

2. Welcomes the request of the General Assembly that the Secretary-General take the necessary measures in order to assist, in cooperation with the Organization of American States, in the solution of the crisis in Haiti;

3. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 5 to 14 below, which are consistent with the trade embargo recommended by the Organization of American States, shall come into force at 00.01 EST on 23 June 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, has reported to the Council that, in light of the results of the negotiations conducted by the Special Envoy for Haiti of the United Nations and the Organization of American States Secretaries-General, the imposition of such measures is not warranted at that time;

4. Decides that if at any time after the submission of the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General, having

regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, reports to the Council that the de facto authorities in Haiti have failed to comply in good faith with their undertakings in the above-mentioned negotiations, the provisions set forth in paragraphs 5 to 14 below shall come into force immediately;

5. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories, to any person or body in Haiti or to any person or body for the purpose of any business carried on in or operated from Haiti, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;

6. Decides to prohibit any and all traffic from entering the territory or territorial sea of Haiti carrying petroleum or petroleum products, or arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, in violation of paragraph 5 above;

7. Decides that the Committee established by paragraph 10 below may authorize on an exceptional case-by-case basis under a no-objection procedure the importation, in non-commercial quantities and only in barrels or bottles, of petroleum or petroleum products, including propane gas for cooking, for verified essential humanitarian needs, subject to acceptable arrangements for effective monitoring of delivery and use;

8. Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds derived from property, (a) of the Government of Haiti or of the de facto authorities in Haiti, or (b) controlled directly or indirectly by such Government or authorities or by entities, wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by such Government or authorities, shall require all persons and entities within their own territories holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the de facto authorities in Haiti;

9. Calls upon all States, and all international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to 23 June 1993;

10. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 below;

(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of this resolution;